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Abstract: This manuscript demonstrates how the use of securitization by the German political
party the Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) has gained them votes in the German federal
elections. The securitization focused on the refugee crisis and the effects that the refugees
would have on Germany and its citizens. While mainstream German political parties adopted a
neutral stance towards the crisis, the AfD separated themselves by adopting a strong
anti-immigrant stance. The concept of securitization has not been fully applied to the German
political parties. As a proxy for the political party, the paper analyzes the policy platforms and
statements regarding immigration, designed to gain popularity and votes. In order to do this, the
paper first defines securitization and then analyzes a variety of sources, including the political
parties’ manifestos, in order to show how they have developed and changed their political
agendas and beliefs between the years of 2013-2019. This paper compares voting polls and
statistics to examine how the party’s use of securitization has garnered them popularity and
votes and to find which groups tend to vote for them. The research showed that the party’s shift
to securitizing the refugee crisis resulted in the increase of votes in the German federal
elections. The AfD placed a sizable focus on their campaign towards immigration after the
beginning of the crisis in 2015. For the AfD whose whole campaign focused on immigration, it
saw a huge boost of votes during the 2017 German Federal election, managing to reach third
place in the number of votes it received.
Introduction
During the final years of the Cold War, international relations theorists wanted to broaden and
deepen the military-based, state-centric focus of security studies. Traditionalist theorists such as
Henry Kissinger and Thomas Schelling argued to keep the conception of security that was
created during the Cold War while non-traditionalists argued for the widening and deepening of
the terms and concepts that were introduced as a result of global changes. One of the major
architects of the non-traditionalist side was the Copenhagen School of Security Studies, a
school of academic thought initiated by international relations theorists Barry Buzan and Ole
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Wæver. The Copenhagen School focuses on the non-military characteristics of security, the
sectors, as they call it, which are comprised of military, societal, political, economic, and
environmental. The main text of the Copenhagen School, Security: A New Framework for
Analysis (Buzan & Waever 1997), details the main views of the school and gives an in-depth
description of each sector. In their work, securitization is introduced as an extreme version of
politicization and is defined as the intersubjective establishment of an existential threat with a
saliency sufficient to have substantial political effects (Buzan & Wæver 1997, p. 25.)
Securitization is used by state actors to transform subjects into security threats. By doing so,
state actors aim to raise the threat levels of such subjects for political gains. In many ways,
securitizing issues seem to have become a normal state of affairs.
Methodology
Since my interest lies in European and especially, German politics, this research project
analyzes how the process of securitization is utilized by the German political party The
Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) to bring attention and recognition to their
main policies. For the party, I analyze the policy platforms and statements regarding
immigration, designed to gain popularity and votes. In order to do this, the paper will first define
securitization and the applicable sectors and then analyze a variety of sources, including the
party’s manifestos, in order to show how they have developed and changed their political
agendas and beliefs between the years of 2013-2019. I compare voting polls’ statistics to
determine how the party’s use of securitization has garnered them popularity and votes and to
find which groups tend to vote for them. While this correlation does not necessarily equal
causation, there seems to be a trend between the increase in securitized topics and gains at the
polls. I expect to find that the party’s successful use of securitization resulted in an increase in
votes and public opinion that has helped them secure seats in the Bundestag, State
Parliaments, and European Parliament. The results of this research will connect securitization
with the politics of Germany and show how the successful use of securitization can turn the
beliefs and ideologies of a party into an important political agenda.
Securitization
Before looking at the case of German politics, the concept of securitization and the five factors
present in the literature will be analyzed in-depth. Securitization is a term that houses different
meanings depending on the field being analyzed. In this case, securitization is being looked at
and applied in the field of politics and more specifically, German politics. In essence,
securitization securitizes public issues by presenting them as pressing issues that require
emergency actions that have to bypass the standard political systems in place. Buzan and
Wæver believe that securitization creates ‘so-called’ existential threats that go above the
established rules put in place to deal with those. Such a move is successful when the actor
utilizing securitization is able to break free of the procedures that apply under ordinary
circumstances. The authors state that there are two thresholds that must be crossed for a
securitization act to occur. The first one is a discourse that presents something as an existential
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threat to a referent object and convinces the audience to take extreme measures to resolve it
and the second one is an existential threat that commands such extreme measures to be taken.
The discourse must be successful for the threat to be stopped.
The main four components that are involved in the securitization act are: (1) an actor or entity
that can make the securitizing move, (2) an object or idea that can be identified as harmful or
dangerous, (3) a referent object that is being threatened by the threat and has to be protected,
and (4) an audience which is the target of the act who must be convinced that the object or idea
must become a security threat. The securitizing actor must create a discourse that presents an
issue as existential to a referent object. The discourse presented to an audience during
securitization is one of the most important parts of the process since securitization itself is a
speech act. A speech act is not something that can be qualified as real, rather the discourse of
securitization is the speech act itself. In the case of German politics, speech acts are usually
found in the manifestos published by the parties and speeches done in events such as the
parties’ annual meetings and during election campaigns.
The language of the discourse must invoke a sense of urgency and survival that warns the
audience that if the problem is not solved, it may destroy them in the future. In the case of
Germany, the main actors using securitization are smaller fringe parties who are located at
opposite ends of the political spectrum unlike the two established mainstream parties, the
Christian Democratic Union of Germany and the Social Democratic Party of Germany, whose
political beliefs are more centralized.
Another component that may affect how securitization occurs is the sector that the actor
believes the threat may affect. Existential threats and audiences vary by sector and the actor
must make sure to know in which sector they wish to carry out the process. Buzan and Wæver
introduced five different sectors in their book and explained the differences between them by
looking at the interactions within them and existential threats to them. The first sector is the
military sector which is about forceful coercion relationships where the referent object is
normally the state or a similar political entity. The second sector is the political sector which is
about governing status and authority relationships. In the political sector, an existential threat
targets the sovereignty and ideologies of the state. The third sector is the economic sector
which is about finance, production, and trade relationships.
The most important sector for this research is the fourth sector, that being the societal sector,
which is about collective identity relationships. In the societal sector, an existential threat will
target the collective identity of whichever group that is the referent object in the sector. The
societal sector is the main sector in which the Alternative fur Deutschland utilizes the
securitization process to present immigration as an existential threat to the identity of the
German population. The fifth and final sector is the environmental sector which is about the
relationships between human activity and the planetary biosphere. In the end, the act will only
be triumphant once it manages to convince the audience. Buzan and Wæver believe that the
most distinguishing feature of securitization is the specific rhetoric that accompanies it.
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The Bundestag and the Party
Before introducing the party, a short explanation of how the federal system of Germany works is
necessary. The Bundestag is the parliament of the Federal Republic of Germany. Along with the
Bundesrat, the Bundestag is the legislative branch of the German political system. Another
important function of the Bundestag is the election of the German Chancellor. The members of
the Bundestag are elected every four years. Members are elected by universal suffrage under a
system of mixed direct and proportional representation (Bundestag.de, n.d.).
Each citizen has two votes for the Bundestag. The first vote allows the citizen to select a local
representative to the Bundestag. Half of the members of the Bundestag are elected directly from
electoral districts, with each one electing one member by a first past-the-vote system. The
second vote selects a candidate from a party list which determines the relative strength of the
party in the Bundestag. At least five-hundred and ninety-eight members are elected this way
and parties who gain a minimum of five percent of the second votes or win three constituency
votes are given a seat in the Bundestag in proportion with the number of votes they received
(Bundestag.de).
Operationalizing a definition for both refugees and immigrants is critical to this paper. An
immigrant is a person who decides to leave their country in order to settle in another country
(rescue.org). An immigrant usually goes through a process to become a citizen in the new
country and always has the option to return to their old country. On the other hand, a refugee is
a person who has had to flee their country because of circumstances such as war, violence, or
prosecution. These individuals often must abandon their homes and cannot go back until it is
safe for them to do so. In order to be considered a refugee, an entity such as an international
organization or a government must determine if the person can seek international protection. An
asylum seeker is also seeking international protection but has not had the status of refugee
granted to them (rescue.org).
The next section will introduce the Alternative für Deutschland. The Alternative für Deutschland
or AfD is a German far-right party that was created in 2013. Over the years, the party has
gained notoriety for holding racist, xenophobic, and Islamophobic ideological views (Vox, 2019).
These can be normally found within populist parties or neo-Nazi parties and are not ideologies
that are held by most of the German population (The German Times). The AfD, according to
their party program and in contrast to the mainstream Volksparteien, holds views that are
nationalistic, anti-immigration, anti-abortion, and climate change skeptic among many others.
These views have provided them with a significant following in some East German states but
have also earned them a bad reputation in Germany and in Europe overall. While the party is
known today as a populist far-right party, it began as a conservative right-wing party whose
focus was its dissatisfaction with German federal policies concerning the eurozone crisis.
However, its focus shifted following the migrant crisis of 2015 and 2016 and it became more of a
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right-wing extremist/populist party. Another important aspect of the AfD which will be introduced
now and later expanded on in the article by looking at the party’s actions is the party’s racism
and more specifically its xenophobia, which later expanded to focus strongly on Islamophobia.
In an article published by Thomas Klikauer, he explains that the AfD “draws a sharp line
between Germanic race and multiculturalism and Islam.” He states that the party’s racism is
often expressed as xenophobic hatred for all foreigners who are not German. According to
Klikauer, their hatred is intertwined, and often emphasized, by hatred for modernity (Klikauer
2018 p. 618).
The AfD securitization of migration
This section will offer a chronological outline of the party’s securitization processes. Although a
party that emerged recently, the AfD has enjoyed a considerable amount of popularity
considering how their ideologies and views compare to that of the rest of the German citizens.
Even if the party has been associated with extremist ideals and violent stances, it currently
holds the third biggest number of seats in the German Bundestag (Bundestag.de). The main
event that caused the founding of the AfD was Angela Merkel’s reversal of her promise to not
financially aid Greece directly during the height of the Euro-crisis in 2011. Hours later, Angela
Merkel was in talks with the other European leaders to send a care package to Greece
(Lachmann, 2012). The party revealed itself to the public on April 14, 2013, when it held a
convention where it chose various leaders and speakers to represent the party, founded by
Alexander Gauland, a journalist and lawyer; Bernd Lucke, an economist, and Konrad Adam,
also a journalist. Their main goal focused on the abolition of the euro, taking a more radical
approach than other similar parties at that moment.
In their founding appeal dubbed the Election Alternative 2013, the AfD called for the dissolution
of the euro, stating that Germany is in no need of the euro and that it negatively affects the
country. They demand the reintroduction of a national currency or at least the creation of a
smaller currency. They called for the amendment of the European treaties in order to allow each
state to democratically decide its own currency (Wahlprogramm 2013, p. 1). Among other
things, the party laments the lack of control that has been posed by the politicians in Brussels.
In their 2013 program, the AfD briefly mentions immigration, calling for skilled and inclusive
immigration based on the Canadian model (Wahlprogramm 2013, p. 4). While they believe that
a heavily persecuted person should be able to seek asylum in Germany, they state that
unordered immigration into the nation’s social system should be stopped at all cost
(alternative-hamburg.de).
During an interview with the German outlet the Deutsche Welle on April 16, 2013, founding
member Konrad Adam stated that the euro union has had “extremely unpleasant
consequences” for Germany and many southern countries. Regarding their political affiliation,
Adam stated that fitting the parties into a left or right spectrum does no longer work. According
to him, the AfD is committed to “reduce this sorry state of affairs.” However, the party will not
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use the current government methods since they believe those are not to be trusted (DW.de April
2013).
Let’s review the securitization process and see how it applies to the founding and beginnings of
the Alternative für Deutschland. In this instance, the actor of the process is the AfD party which
is presenting the euro as the threat. The referent object, in this case, is Germany and the
audience are the citizens of Germany. The solutions presented here by the party are not
solutions that would seriously be considered by the German government. In fact, the other
German parties have criticized the AfD and their platform as populist and nationalist, fearing that
they will attract conservative and nationalistic anti-EU individuals. Green Party parliamentary
chief Jurgen Trittin stated that the party is “advocating something that is unfounded, dangerous
and illusionary” (DW.de April 2013). The AfD presents itself as the alternative solution to the
problems which plague the German nation.
Between March 31 and May 12, 2013, the party found affiliates in all 16th German states. During
the first election that the party participated in, the 2013 German federal election that occurred on
September 22, the AfD managed to win 1.9% of the first votes and 4.7% of the second votes.
However, it did not reach the 5% vote requirement to enter the parliament. The party was able
to amass around 2 million votes and it got its strongest support from the states of Saxony,
Brandenburg, and Thuringia, states located in the eastern region of Germany which previously
belonged to East Germany (Bundeswahlleiter.de). Throughout its career, the eastern states of
Germany will prove themselves to be the strongest supporters of the AfD, and we will take a
more in-depth look at the reasons why this may be the case.
In January of 2014, the AfD hosted a party conference. While the party’s beginning was
disappointing, it seems that their focus on the euro crisis was not too successful. Nevertheless,
the party found an audience to which they can promote their beliefs and message. During the
conference, the party shifted its focus to match the growing anti-EU sentiment which was
growing. Members warned citizens of a loss of cultural identity. The party argued that the EU
had lost its ways of democracy and solidarity and opposed the idea of a centralized European
State, favoring more sovereign states in the EU. Member Beatrix von Storch stated that
“democracy only functions at a national level.” During the conference, founder Lucke stated that
the AfD was an outsider to the political landscape and was in a battle against the other political
parties and their alliances who he believed too hard on pleasing everyone (DW.de January
2014).
With this conference, we can see that the party has shifted the focus of what they securitize
from the economic sector to the societal sector. This sector is primarily focused on the collective
identity of a group or community. Societal insecurity exists when the communities define a new
development or change as a threat to their survival as a community (Buzan & Wæver 1997, p.
119). At the party conference, the AfD securitized one of the most common issues that is
described in Buzan and Wæver’s book. They call it vertical competition and explain the issue as
a threat which “will cause people to stop seeing themselves as x because there is an integration
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project that pulls them toward either wider or narrower identities (Buzan & Wæver 1997, p.
121).” This shift proved to be successful because during the 2014 European Parliament election
in Germany, which was held on May 25, the party was able to gain 7.1% of the national vote
(around 2 million votes), placing it as the fifth most popular party among German voters
(Europarl.europa.eu). Thanks to the votes, the party won seven seats in the European
Parliament, marking the first victory for the AfD.
During a party conference on July 4, 2015, Frauke Petry was elected as de facto party speaker,
succeeding Bernd Lucke. A member of the national-conservative faction of the AfD, Petry’s
leadership signaled a shift in focus to immigration and the perceived cultural intrusion of Islam.
Previous principal speaker Bernd Lucke believed that Petry’s leadership turned the party into a
far-right Pegida Party (sueddeutsche.net 2015). ‘Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of
the Occident’ or Pegida, is a German-nationalist, anti-Islam political movement. The movement
made up of various far-right parties and disenchanted German citizens seemed to have
developed out of the frustrations that German citizens were feeling with regards to the migration
laws and the increasing population of Muslim citizens as a result of the migrant crisis
(Spiegel.de 2014). The movement was heavily criticized by Chancellor Angela Merkel who
urged those attending the demonstrations to not follow the leaders and creators of the rallies,
saying that they “too often have prejudice, coldness, and even hatred in their hearts” (The
Guardian 2014). However, while the party did have its detractors, a poll done by the German
news website Der Spiegel found that around 34 percent of German citizens agreed with the
statement that the movement was making with regards to their belief that Germany was
increasingly becoming Islamicized (Spiegel.de 2014). The joining of the movement by the AfD
was one of the earliest signs of the party’s focus on Islam when it came to their anti-immigration
rhetoric.
Another example of this rhetoric occurred at a party congress between April 30 and May 1,
2016, the AfD adopted a strong platform against Islam and its symbols, using the slogan “Islam
is not part of Germany.” By this time, the party had already planted itself as anti-immigration
following the migrant wave that began in 2015. The party called for the ban of Islamic symbols
such as burkas, minarets, and the call to prayer (independent.co.uk 2016).
Throughout the years, the party’s anti-immigration rhetoric seemed to focus almost exclusively
on the migration of Middle Eastern refugees, more specifically those of the Islamic faith. The
current leader of the AfD in the Bundestag, Alice Weidel, stated, while she was a lead candidate
for the party, that the party wanted to achieve “negative immigration” and that they believed that
Germany was being “Islamified” (Arthur, 2017). In one interview with the magazine The Atlantic,
Alexander Gauland, cofounder of the AfD, explained the party’s reason for why they don’t
believe that Islam is part of Germany. Gauland believes that the values based on Sharia Law
are not compatible with Germany’s Basic Law. Furthermore, he gave various reasons as to why
Germany and Islam are not compatible stating that “Islam does not know the parity of men and
women,” “Islamic states are not democratic states with democratic values,” and Islam would
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make many changes to German society which people would not like very much (Friedman,
2017).
The party’s anti-Islam stance was seen in their comments surrounding the Jihadist attacks
between 2015 and 2016. Attacks such as those occurring in Paris in November 2015, the
Brussels Bombing attack of March 2016 which resulted in the death of 32 people, and the Berlin
Attack of December 2016 which resulted in the death of 12 people saw mass casualties
attributed to extremist actors claiming Islamic affiliations (Nesser, 2016). The AfD took
advantage of these terrorist events to attack Merkel’s immigrant policies. AfD leader Frauke
Petra stated that the environment for these attacks resulted from the negligence and
mismanagement of the refugee policies by Angela Merkel. Furthermore, Marcus Pretzell, a
candidate from the AfD sent a tweet stating that the deaths in the Berlin attack were “Merkel’s
Death” (Delcker, 2016).
These views were once again reiterated in the party’s 2017 manifesto. While their small 2013
manifesto mostly focused on their stance against the euro and their policies regarding the EU,
this manifesto expanded into anti-migrant beliefs. In it, chapters 7 and 9 are dedicated to their
views on culture, identity, Islam, and immigration. Chapter 7 focuses on German culture and
identity. The party believes that “the link between education, culture, and identity is of
paramount importance for the development of society” (Grundsatzprogramm, 2017, p. 45). On
the topic of multiculturalism, the manifesto states that it is a “serious threat to social peace and
the survival of the nation-state as a cultural unit,” and that the government and civil society have
a duty to protect German cultural identity as the predominant identity (Grundsatzprogramm
2017, p. 46). The majority of chapter 7 is specifically focused on the views that the AfD has on
Islam. In section 7.6, the AfD claims that Islam does not belong in Germany since the
ever-increasing population of Muslims is “a danger to our state, our society, and our values”
(Grundsatzprogramm, 2017, p. 48). In their eyes, Islam does not respect the legal system, and
is incompatible with their culture, identity, and the Christian religion. The word threat is used
again when referring to Mosques. A big issue that makes Islam a threat in the eyes of the AfD is
their use of Mosques, Sharia laws, and Islamic radicalization to expand their “power base”
(Grundsatzprogramm, 2017, p. 48-49) that can result in turning Muslims into terrorists or violent
Salafists. Overall, with the migrant wave in effect, we saw that the AfD particularly targets the
Muslim population in Germany and singles them out when speaking about their beliefs on Islam.
In the manifesto, the word Islam is used more times, thirty-seven to be exact, than any other
word related to immigration such as refugee (14 times) and immigrant (23 times).
Chapter 9 of the AfD manifesto focuses on mass immigration in Europe. The AfD believes that a
distinction between refugees and irregular immigrants should be made. To the AfD, refugees
should be granted shelter, though refugees’ residence permits should be time-limited
(Grundsatzprogramm, 2017, p. 58). The party demands strict controls at German borders in
order to prevent an uncontrolled influx of immigrants and states that international agreements
such as the Geneva Convention of 1951 should be adapted to present-day conditions so that
the German Asylum Laws won’t be misused anymore as a vehicle for mass immigration. On the
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topic of integration, the party believes that the concept of a multi-culturally society has failed
(Grundsatzprogramm, 2017, p. 61-62).
With the shifting focus to identity and culture, the AfD received the highest amount of support
since its inception. Those numbers would be surpassed in the 2017 German federal election. By
looking at the data provided by Politico on the German citizen’s intent to vote we can see that
the AfD found its highest support on September 29, 2014, a few months after the European
Parliament election in 2014 with nine percent of the citizen’s votes (Politico.eu). The party’s
percentage slowly trickled down to its lowest point around the end of July 2015 with three
percent of the votes. However, right after the beginning of the migrant crisis of September 2015,
when the party focused its views on immigration, we saw an increase to 14 percent in Summer
2016. Unfortunately for them, voter support began to once again dwindle at the beginning of
2017 until the German federal election of 2017, when it peaked with 17 percent in September.
During this time the party even tied with the SPD, one of Germany’s most popular and biggest
parties (Politico.eu).
The German federal election of 2017 provided the biggest results for the AfD since they won 5.3
constituency votes (11.5% of the votes) which won them three seats and 5.9 million party votes
(12.6% of the votes) which won them 91 seats. Winning 12.6% of the total votes allowed the
party to join the German Bundestag and with a total of 94 seats, the party became the third
biggest party in the Bundestag. Once again, the party received its biggest support from the
states of Saxony, Thuringia, and Brandenburg, former East Germany states that have been the
biggest supporters for the AfD both in this election and in the previous election
(bundeswahlleiter.de). The East German states are known for being post-communist states and
the poorer states of Germany. A study on Islam in Germany found that 66 percent of eastern
Germany respondents answered that they saw Islam as a threat, 11 percent more than western
Germany, with the land of Saxony scoring the highest percentage at 77 percent
(bertelsmann-stiftung.de 2015)
Another study done on the support populations of the AfD found that a big percentage of the
supporters of the AfD were people who did not have a graduate education or an Abitur (Juho,
2018, p. 6) (fig. 1) and earned less than 1250 euros a month (Juho, 2018, p. 6) (fig. 2). While
another study found that a big percentage of the supporters came from East Germany and were
either unemployed (Roth & Wolff 2017 Unemployment Graph) or working in blue-collar
professions (Roth & Wolff 2017 Income Graph).
Figure 1 (Arbitur Pass
Rate of parties’
supporters)
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Figure 2: Proportion
of parties’
supporters with a
monthly income of
1250 euros or less

However, it was not only the blue-collar workers that found themselves giving their support to
the AfD. In a 2018 article, author Charles Lees writes about a study that shows the percentage
of electoral support that the party received by social milieu. Lees explains that the electoral
support of the party was concentrated in three distinct social groups: The Precariat, the
respectable middle class, and the traditionalists. The Precariat was described as
part-time/temporary employed or unemployed individuals, the respectable middle class was
described as full-time employed, often in the private sector, with a high number of house
ownership, and finally, the traditionalists was explained as putting higher value in Germany’s
cultural legacy, resent rapid social change, and have concerns about Islam and high levels of
immigration. Lees explains that while the Precariat was the most likely group to vote for the AfD
in the 2017 election, the presence of the middle class and traditionalist supports the view that
the AfD’s political message “resonated strongly with voters who felt cultural discomfort with
modern Germany as well as with voters who felt real economic distress” (Lees, 2018, p, 303).
With regards to the European Parliament election of 2019, the AfD managed to win around four
million votes for the European Parliament election. The results of this election were much better
than the 2014 election and the party managed to gain double the votes and four extra seats for
the European Parliament. The AfD was also one of the only parties, along with the Greens
party, another German party that can be found on the opposite political spectrum to the AfD, to
see an increase in the seats gained.
A study by Simon Franzmann, Heiko Giebbler, and Thomas Poguntke (2019) focused on the
electoral strategies used in the 2017 election. The writers make a distinction between two
different issues, the valence issues which mainstream parties favor and the socio-cultural
positional issues which are being used by the AfD. By using a unique survey with both valence
and socio-cultural issues plus an analysis of Twitter accounts, the study found that the
contemporary polarization of the German electorate is due to socio-cultural issues, especially on
the issue of migration. Furthermore, the authors specify that polarization may be caused by the
antagonism between the AfD and the Greens. While the more mainstream parties such as the
SPD and CSU focused on valence issues, the Greens and the AfD can mobilize by focusing on
socio-cultural issues (Franzmann, 2019). This study shows that the securitization of immigration
done by the AfD was done strategically and has resulted in an increase of votes.
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Conclusion
The use of securitizing migration by the AfD has been a quite successful one for the party. The
AfD strategically separated themselves from all of the other Bundestag parties with their shift
from their anti-Euro stance to anti-immigration. Becoming Germany’s right-wing party gained
them a following and a demographic which they can rely on for votes. They increasingly spoke
of the dangers and evils of immigration and of the refugees who abuse the system.
Furthermore, their strategy on appealing to people’s identity and fear of losing that identity is a
clear way to securitize an issue in the societal sector on which both parties operate on. Looking
into the future, it does not seem that the AfD is losing any steam. The upcoming 2021 German
federal election will provide another opportunity for a case study to see if the continuing
securitization of the party has been continually successful.
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